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I. INTRODUCTION

"The law, as happens in many cases, has not kept up with technology....
[T]his is just the latest skirmish in a longer-term war."'
* J.D. Candidate, Villanova University School of Law, 2008.
1. Joe LaPointe, Blogger's Ejection May Mean SuitforNCAA, N.Y. TIMEs, June 14,2007,
at D5 (quoting Norwestem University Journalism Professor Rich Gordon), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/14/sports/baseball/14blogs. html?ex7-1339473600%20and%20en
=af2e93ba39d5fd78%20and%20ei=5090%20and%20partner=rssuserland%20and%20emc=rss.
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The evolution of sports reporting to include blogs written as an athletic
contest unfolds has collided with event organizers, such as the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), desire to protect its contractual
commitments with broadcasters such as ESPN. Brian Bennett, a sports
reporter for the Courier-Journalnewspaper in Louisville, Kentucky,
learned this lesson the hard way when the NCAA ejected him from the
College World Series of Baseball for blogging live updates during an
NCAA baseball game.2 The NCAA claimed Bennett's blog violated the
exclusive broadcast rights it granted to ESPN to televise the game.' By
contrast, Bennett claimed the ejection violated his First Amendment right
to report on a newsworthy event.4 As new technologies emerge, speech
and property interests will continue to conflict with one another. Yet, how
should courts balance these apparently competing interests at a time when
the law can barely keep up with technology? Beyond the world of sports
reporting, the Bennett case could have wide-ranging implications for how
the public receives information, regulation on the Internet, and a host of
legal issues.5
"It's clearly a First Amendment issue," Bennett's editor, Bennie Ivory
said 6 According to Ivory, the blog is just "part of the evolution of how we
present the news to our readers."7 The paper's attorney, Jon Fleischaker,
added, "It's a real question that we're being deprived of our right to report
within the First Amendment from a public facility.... The blog wasn't a
simulcast or a recreation of the game. It was an analysis." 8 Yet, where does
Bennett's right to report end and the NCAA's and ESPN's right to protect
their broadcast rights begin?
According to the NCAA's general counsel, Scott Bearby, Bennett's
case "doesn't really have a First Amendment angle to it."9 Moreover,
Bearby argued the NCAA policy on blogging is just "a logical extension

2. Brian Bennett, Ejected and Dejected, LouIsvIuLE COURIER-JOURNAL, June 10, 2007,
http://www.courier-journal.com/blogs/ bennett/2007/06/ejected-and-dejected.html.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., LaPointe, supra note 1, at D5 ("The eviction of a newspaper reporter from a
baseball press box for blogging about a game while it was in progress has stirred a debate about
First Amendment rights, intellectual property rights and contract law.").
6. Rick Bozich, Courier-JournalReporter ejectedfrom U of L Gram, COURIER-JOURNAL,
June 11, 2007, at IC (quoting Courier-Journalexecutive editor Bennie Ivory).
7. Id.
8. Id. (quoting Jon Fleischaker, attorney for the Courier-Journal).
9. LaPointe, supranote 1 (quoting Scott Bearby, associate general counsel for NCAA).
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of the rights that have been around for years and years."10 Among
commentators there seems to be little consensus about which position is
correct.
This Article examines how the courts have, and should, balance these
potentially competing speech and property interests in the context of new
communications technologies. First, the background of this Article
explains the relevant facts of Bennett's case and describes "blogs" in
greater detail. Part I of the analysis examines the relevant First
Amendment issues applicable to blogs, Part II considers the various
intellectual property concerns, and Part Ill addresses the public policy
concerns highlighted by Bennett's case. Finally, this Article concludes
with recommendations for how courts should balance free speech and
intellectual property interests in blogging and other communications
technologies going forward.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Facts of Bennett's Case
The Courier-Journalassigned Brian Bennett to cover the University of
Louisville (Louisville) baseball team in the 2007 College World Series."
Bennett blogged every Louisville game during the first two weeks of the
12
tournament without incident-none of these games were televised.
Louisville's first televised game was against Oklahoma State on June 10.13
Throughout the tournament, the NCAA issued a series of memos regarding
blogging-each one different from the one before."4 Approximately one
hour before the Oklahoma State game, the NCAA circulated yet another
memo regarding blogging. 15 The memo read, in part:
The College World Series Media Coordination staff along with the
NCAA Broadcasting group needs to remind all media coordinators

10. Id.
11. Bennett, supra note 2.
12. Telephone Interview with Jon Fleischaker, General Counsel, Courier-Journal, (June 17,
2007) [hereinafter Fleischaker].
13. NCAA BaseballTournamentSchedule, Results, ESPN, June 25,2007, http://sports.espn.
go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=2884867.
14. Daniel Terdiman, BloggerRemovedfrom NCAA BaseballGamefor Blogging, June 11,
2007, http://www.news.com/8301-10784_3-9728156-7.html.
15. Bennett, supra note 2.
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that any statistical or other live representation of the Super Regional
games falls under the exclusive broadcasting and Internet rights
granted to the NCAA's official rights holders and therefore is not
allowed by any other entity. Since blogs are considered a live
representationof the game, any blog that has action photos or game
reports, including play-by-play, scores or any in-game updates, is
specifically prohibited. In essence, no blog entries are permitted
between the first pitch and the final out of each game.16
The NCAA did not include this restriction in the press credential issued
to Bennett, nor did he ever agree to such a limitation. 7 Accordingly,
Bennett continued to blog as he had throughout the tournament." At some
point early in the game, the NCAA discovered, contrary to their latest
guidelines, Bennett was still blogging. 1"Accordingly, the NCAA requested
Louisville remove Bennett from the game.2" Initially, Louisville refused,
and for the next several innings the two parties discussed what to do about
Bennett.2 Ultimately, Louisville left the decision to the NCAA, which
chose to eject Bennett from the game. 2
The ejection drew strong criticism from newspapers, Internet
commentators, and the legal community. 23 In its defense, the NCAA
claimed the ejection was necessary to preserve broadcast rights it granted
to ESPN to cover the tournament. 24 The NCAA has lucrative licensing

16. Id. (quoting NCAA memo) (emphasis added).
17. Id. See also LaPointe, supra note 1 (stating that the NCAA likely could have contracted
to condition access to the event with a restriction against blogging such as "[t]hou shalt not blog.").
Bennett, supra note 2 (noting that a restriction would only have prevented Bennett from blogging
from the press box. Bennett could still have blogged from other parts of the stadium open to the
public or by watching the television broadcast.).
18. Bennett, supra note 2.
19. Id.
20. Eric Crawford, NCAA Showed What It'sAbout-Cash andControl,COURIER-JOURNAL,
June 13, 2007, available at http://www.courier-journal.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?Date=
20070613&Category=COLUMNISTS02&ArtNo=706131193&SectionCat=SPORTS02&Templ
ate=printart.
21. Fleischaker, supra note 12.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Troy Johnson, Commentary, Blog This: NCAA Wrongfor Pulling the Plug,
COLUMBUS LEDGER-INQUIRER, June 13, 2007, at BI; Eric Crawford, NCAA Showed What It's

About: Cash and Control, COURIER-JoURNAL, June 13, 2007, http://www.courierjournal.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070613/COLUMNISTS02/706131193;
Andrew
Wolfson, NCAA CriticizedforEjectingReporter Who Blogged ata Game, COURIER-JOURNAL, June
12, 2007, at IC.
24. Bennett, supra note 2.
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deals with networks such as CBS and ESPN to broadcast its championship
sporting events. 2' For instance, CBS recently agreed to pay the NCAA six
billion dollars for the right to broadcast the NCAA Men's Basketball
Tournament. 26 Blogging, as the Bennett case shows, is perceived by some
as a threat to this valuable source of NCAA revenue.
After the negative publicity the NCAA received over Bennett's
ejection, it amended its blogging policy to allow some blogging at its
sporting events. 27 Consequently, Bennett and the Courier-Journalchose
not to litigate. 28 However, Bennett's case is just one of several recent
blogging controversies. 29 Thus, a clear solution is necessary.
B. Background on Blogs
The term "blog" is short for web log, an online journal containing a
series of entries arranged in reverse chronological order, written by one
author or a common set of authors. 30 A "Bloggers" are authors of blogs,
a blog is devoted
and "blogging" is the act of writing a blog.3' Typically,
33
32
to a particular subject such as sports or politics, but many cover more.

25. 2007-08 NCAA BROADCAST MANUAL CHAMPIONSHIP GUIDELINES, § 7 (2005) URL,
http://wwwl.ncaa.org/eprise/main/Public/CBA/BrdcstMan/Sect7/Rights ("The NCAA owns the
television rights to all 88 championship events.") (last visited Feb. 17, 2008).
26. Richard Sandomir, CBS Will Pay $6 Billionfor Men's NCAA Tournament,N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 19, 1999, at D5, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
9A01E6D6173CF93AA25752C 1A96F958260&n=Top/News/Business/Companies/CBS%20Co
rporation.
27. Associated Press, NCAA Says Live Updates Via Blog Limited to Score, Time Remaining
Only, ESPN, June 21, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=2912100.
28. Fleischaker, supra note 12.
29. See, e.g., FOCUS: Blogs by Olympic Participantsto be Banned, YAHOO! ASIA NEWS,
Jan. 30, 2005, http://asia.news.yahoo.com/060130/kyodo/d8feluig7.html. Several commentators
have reported a perceived bias against online reporters, and private entities have allegedly
continued to discriminate against Internet journalists by refusing to grant credentials. See, e.g.,
David Noack, Bias Against Online News Reporters: The Second Class Citizens of Journalism,
EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Jan. 31, 1998, at S13. Noack noted that in 1998, organizations such as the
National Collegiate Athletic Association were consistently discriminating against Internet
journalists because they were not traditional reporters; the NCAA cited its own "exclusive" rights
to provide coverage of its events. Id.
30. See Wikipedia, Blog, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blog (describing history and types of
blogs) (as of Feb. 4, 2008, 9:50 EST).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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Initially, blogging provided a format for writers not associated with the
mass media, to present information and commentary to the public. 34 Now,
blogging has evolved into a staple of the established press. Today, nearly
every major newspaper maintains a web site, and within the web site, a
blog or multiple blogs. Blogs have become so popular that Technorati, the
leading site tracking the growth of blogging, currently estimates there are
more than ninety-five million blogs published worldwide.35
Event-blogs, also called "game-blogs" or "live-blogs" are no different
from other blogs. In fact, an event-blog is often just a regular blog updated
more frequently during a particular game or event. 36 Bennett's blog is
typical in this regard. He maintains a standing blog on the Courier-Journal
web site and simply updates it more frequently during games he covers for
the paper. 37 In sports, blogs provide current updates on the progress of a
sporting event where radio and television are unavailable.38 However,
blogs may also be used to provide current information on other
newsworthy events, such as a political speech 39 or criminal trial.4"
In recent years, disputes over blogs covering live events have become
more frequent. For instance, the Japanese Olympic Committee refused to
credential bloggers for the Nagano Olympic Games.4 In another example,
the NCAA denied credentials to online reporters who wanted to cover the
Division I Men's Basketball Tournament, effectively eliminating the
chance to report real time scores from the event.42 Finally, the New York
Islanders professional hockey team-not knowing quite what to do with
bloggers-created 4a3 separate press box for them, which of course, made
everyone unhappy.

34. See id.
35. Technorati Weblog, http://www.technorati.com (last visited Feb. 8, 2008).
36. See, e.g., John Clay, Sidelines, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Feb. 8, 2004, http://
johnclay.typepad.com/sidelines/.
37. See Bennett, supra note 2.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Michael Coren, Bloggers Get Set for State of the Union, CNN, Feb. 2, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/ALLPOLITICS/02/02/union.blog/index.html?iref=newsearch.
40. See, e.g., Enron: Trialwatch, HOUSTON CHRON. ONLINE, Oct. 24, 2006, http://blogs.
chron.com/enrontrialwatch/.
41. Kevin M. Goldberg, Watch Outor Real-Time Coverage Will be Shot Down, ASNE, May
22, 1998, http://www.asne.org/index.cfin?ID=1 842.
42. Julie Panna, Why Can'tI Get One of These?, QUILL, Sept. 1,2000, availableat 2000 WL
6462073.
43. See Eric McErlain, The Blog Box Fails The New Media Test, FANHOUSE, Oct. 9, 2007,
http://sports.aol.com/fanhouse/2007/10/09/the-islanders-blog-box-fails-the-new-media-test/.
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Ultimately, blogs are a form of speech." The First Amendment
ordinarily protects that speech.45 However, holders of various rights, such
as copyrights, also have constitutional protections.' Thus, a solution that
properly balances these interests is needed.
III. ANALYSIS
A. FirstAmendment Concerns
"No one can read the long history which records the stern and often
bloody struggles by which these cardinal rights were secured, without
realizinghow necessary it is to preserve them against any infringement,
however slight. ' 7
Freedom of speech is one of the preeminent rights protected by the U.S.
Constitution.48 The First Amendment provides, in part, that "Congress
shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. '
The Supreme Court has interpreted this right to apply to all branches of the
federal government,5° and through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the states as well.5 ' Free speech, however, is not
absolute. For instance, the First Amendment does not protect speech that

44. See generally C. Edwin Baker, FirstAmendment Limits on Copyright,55 VAND. L. REV.
891 (2002); Steven Fraser, The Conflict Between the FirstAmendment andCopyrightLaw andIts
Impact on the Internet, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1998); Neil Weinstock, Netanel Locating
Copyright Within the FirstAmendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001).
45. See supra note 44.
46. See generallyJed Rubenfeld, The Freedomoflmagination:Copyright s Constitutionality,
112 YALE L.J. 1 (2002).
47. Included in the "cardinal rights" mentioned is the right to free speech. Associated Press
v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 301 U.S. 103, 135 (1937) (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting).
48. See generally David Yassky, Eras of the FirstAmendment, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1699
(1991).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
50. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 716 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
51. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); see also Lowell v. City of Griffin,
303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938).
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incites "imminent lawless action,"52 libelous speech,5 3 fighting words,54
obscenity,55 or child pornography. 6 The Court has concluded that in each
of these instances, the right to free speech is outweighed by a more
substantial government interest. 57 Consequently, if a blog does not fall
under one of these narrow exceptions, it I protected by the First
Amendment.
Although some state action is necessary for the First Amendment to
apply, 58 an exhaustive analysis of state action issues is beyond the scope
of this Article. It is only relevant to note that if the actor is considered a
state actor, then the actor is subject to the First Amendment.59 Conversely,
if the actor is not considered a state actor, the First Amendment does not
apply.6" It is also outside the scope of this Article to consider whether
bloggers may claim First Amendment protection under the speech clause
or press clause. Although there is scholarly debate as to whether the press
clause should provide any constitutional protection beyond that provided
by the speech clause,61 the Court has never granted any special protections
under the press clause.62 Accordingly, none are considered here. Instead,

52. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447-49 (1969) (per curiam) (finding that a state
cannot prosecute Ku Klux Klansmen for making extremely derogatory remarks about blacks and
Jews where the Klansmen did not incite imminent lawless action) (emphasis added).
53. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (establishing the framework
for courts to analyze libel claims).
54. See Chaplinskyv. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (holding that fighting words are
not protected under the First Amendment).
55. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 742-48 (1978) (Stevens, J., announced the
opinion of the Court and was joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J. in stating that offensive
speech should receive less than full protection when broadcasted over the radio).
56. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
57. See, e.g., Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. U.S. at 742-48.
58. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1938).
59. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721 (1961) (finding that no
precise formulation for recognition of state responsibility under Equal Protection Clauses has been
or could be fashioned or applied; "Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the
nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance.").
60. See Cooper, 358 U.S. at 16-17; see alsoJackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345,34950 (1974) ("The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment... 'however discriminatory
or wrongful' ... offers no shield" against private conduct).
61. See, e.g., Joseph S. Alonzo, Restoring theIdeal Marketplace:HowRecognizingBloggers
as JournalistsCan Save the Press,9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.POL'Y 751, 755-56 (2006); see, e.g.,
Paul Horwitz, Or of the [Blog], 11 NEXUS 45, 52-53 (2006); see, e.g., David A. Anderson,
Freedom of the Press,80 TEx. L. REv. 429,436 (2002).
62. Anderson, supra note 61, at 436 ("[The Court] has never had to decide whether a
particular litigant was 'press.' In most cases the question does not arise because the claimed right
would be protected as fully by the Speech Clause as by the Press Clause.").
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this Article will analyze First Amendment concerns assuming there is
sufficient state action present and without any distinction between the
press and speech clauses of the First Amendment.
Courts continually struggle to adapt the First Amendment to new
technologies.63 For years, courts have used a medium-specific approach,
to determine the level of First Amendment protection that should be
afforded to new technologies.' Under this medium-specific approach,
speech conveyed through print historically enjoyed the highest level of
First Amendment protection." However, as new technologies emerged,
courts applied different First Amendment rules, often affording less First
Amendment protection than was applied to print.66 Thus, rather than a
predictable framework for applying the First Amendment to new
technologies, the Court created "a body of law complicated enough to
inspire comparisons with the Internal Revenue Code. 67
1. Radio and Television Broadcasting
Like the Internet today, the development of television and radio
broadcasting challenged courts to apply the First Amendment to new
technologies. Ultimately, two cases, NationalBroadcastingCo. v. United
States68 and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) v. Pacifica
69 set forth the justifications for limiting speech in
Foundation,
broadcasting. In NationalBroadcasting,the Supreme Court established the
doctrine of "spectrum scarcity" as a basis for restricting speech in

63. Jonathan Wallace & Michael Green, Bridgingthe Analogy Gap: the Internet, the Printing
Press,andFreedom of Speech, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 711, 720-22 (1997) (For example, Wallace
and Green point out the Court's struggle to adapt the First Amendment to telephone
communications, moviews, and the radio).
64. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc'ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Different communications media are treated differently for First
Amendment purposes."); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 726, 748 (1978) ("We have long
recognized that each medium of expression presents special First Amendment Problems.").
65. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-25 (2d ed. 1988)
(explaining that "[t]he First Amendment guarantee of freedom from government intrusion reigns
most confidently in the realm of the print media, since newspapers and pamphlets were the most
significant modes of mass communication in the world of the Framers.").
66. See, e.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 381 (1941).
67. Wallace & Green, supra note 63, at 723-24 (quoting STEvEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY AND ROMANCE 2-3 (1990)).

68. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
69. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726.

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLAW&

POLICY

[V/ol. 13

broadcasting.7" In applying speech restrictions to broadcasting that would
be unconstitutional if applied to print, the Court reasoned that because of
the scarcity of available broadcasting frequencies, the FCC could license
broadcasters based on "public interest, convenience, and necessity."'"
In Pacifica,the Court used "pervasiveness" as another reason to limit
free speech on the radio.72 Often called the "Seven Dirty Words" case,
Pacificainvolved the airing of an indecent monologue during an afternoon
radio broadcast.73 In Pacifica,the FCC argued that broadcast media should
receive a reduced level of constitutional protection.74 The Court agreed,
observing that broadcast communication differs from print communication
due to its "uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans."75
Due to its pervasiveness, the government may regulate broadcasting in
ways that would be contrary to the First Amendment if the regulations
were applied to print.76 Because of the doctrines of pervasiveness and
scarcity, broadcasting is accorded "the most limited First Amendment
protection" of any form of mass communication.77
2. Telephone Communications
Today, courts give full First Amendment protection to telephone
communications. However, this was not always the case. For instance, in
City of Richmond v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,78 the Supreme Court denied
telephone companies use of the public right of way for their wires, which
had been granted to telegraph companies for years, because telephone
communications were not in writing.79 Later, in Sable Communicationsof
California, Inc. v. FCC,0 the Court determined that telephone
communications deserve greater First Amendment protection than

70. Nat'lBroad., 319 U.S. at 226 (showing where the Court stated "Freedom of utterance is
abridged to many who wish to use the limited facilities of radio. Unlike other modes of expression,
radio inherently is not available to all. That is its unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other
modes of expression, it is subject to governmental regulation."); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C.,
395 U.S. 367, 286 (1969) (applying spectrum scarcity doctrine to television broadcasting).
71. Id. at 225-26.
72. See generally Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726.
73. Id. at 729-30.
74. Id. at 731.
75. Id. at 748.
76. Id.
77. See Pacifica,438 U.S. at 748 ("[O]f all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that
has received the most limited First Amendment protection.").
78. 174 U.S. 761 (1899).
79. Id.
80. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
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broadcasting.8 ' Distinguishing Sable from its holding in Pacifica, the
Court explained telephone communications are unlike broadcast
communications because they do not bombard a "captive audience" with
unwanted material.82 Instead, the telephone user is required to "take
affirmative steps to receive the communication."83 Thus, telephone
communications receive full First Amendment protection.
3. The Internet
Due to its versatility, the Internet blurs many of the distinctions courts
make between different communication mediums. Nonetheless, courts are
still attempting to apply the medium-specific approach. In Reno v.
ACLU, 4 the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment applies to the
Internet the same as it does to print.8" The Court reasoned that the Internet,
unlike broadcast media, is neither scarce nor pervasive-the two classic
justifications for limiting free speech in new technologies.86 Regarding
scarcity, the Court explained:
[T]he Internet can hardly be considered a "scarce" expressive
commodity. It provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for
communication of all kinds. The Government estimates that "[a]s
many as 40 million people use the Internet today, and that figure is
expected to grow to 200 million by 1999." This dynamic,
multifaceted category of communication includes not only
traditional print and news services, but also audio, video, and still
images, as well as interactive, real-time dialogue. Through the use
of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town
crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any
soapbox. Through the use of [w]eb pages... and newsgroups, the
same individual can become a pamphleteer.87
Regarding pervasiveness, the Court relied on the district court's finding
that "[c]ommunications over the Internet do not 'invade' an individual's

81. See id. at 127 (noting that unique attributes of broadcasting justify granting lower level
of protection to broadcasting than that to telephone communications).
82. Id. at 128.
83. Id.
84. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
85. See id. at 868-69.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 870.
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home or appear on one's computer screen unbidden." 8 Instead,
communications on the Internet "require[] a series of affirmative steps
more deliberate and directed than merely turning a dial."8 9 Thus, due to the
lack of pervasiveness and scarcity, the Court found "no basis for
qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to
[the Internet]." 90
4. Blogs
Court decisions applying the First Amendment to blogs are scant. 9'
Moreover, the current "patchwork"'92 approach to free speech and new
technology consisting of "a complex set of compromises," 93 rather than a
readily-identifiable framework to apply free-speech principles to new
technology fosters continued uncertainty. However, analogical reasoning
may provide an answer where legal precedent does not.
Analogies find "similarit[ies] between two things, on which a
comparison may be based. 9 4 Moreover, "[a]nalogical reasoning plays a
profoundly important role whenever a court must decide the proper legal
rules to apply to a new technology." 95 As noted communications scholar,
Ithiel de Sola Pool explained:
Courts like to treat new phenomena by analogy to old ones. When
the telephone was invented, the question was whether, at law, the
telephone was a new kind of telegraph or something different. If the
phone was a telegraph, a body of law already existed that would
apply. The decisions sometimes went one way, sometimes the
other; but the model of the telegraph was always there to be
considered. 96

88. Id. at 869 (quoting 929 F. Supp., at 844 (finding 88)).
89. Reno, 521 U.S. at 854.
90. Id. at 845.
91. See, e.g., O'Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1423, 1457 (Ct. App. 2006)
(holding that online reporters were entitled to same statutory protections as print reporters).
92. Wallace & Green, supra note 63, at 723.
93. Id.
94. Dictionary.com, Definitions on "analogy," http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/
analogy (last visited Feb. 4, 2008).
95. Wallace & Green, supra note 63, at 720.
96. Id. (quoting ITHIELDE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM IN 1983: OF FREE SPEECH
INAN ELECTRONIC AGE 100 (1983)).
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Blogging is closely analogous to print and, in fact, may be "a far more
speech-enhancing medium than print."97 Judge Dalzell, in the district court
case of ACLU v. Reno, gave four reasons why Internet communications,
including blogs, may contribute to free speech more than print:
First, the Internet presents very low barriers to entry. Second, these
barriers to entry are identical for both speakers and listeners. Third,
as a result of these low barriers, astoundingly diverse content is
available on the Internet. Fourth, the Internet provides significant
access to all who wish to speak in the medium, and even creates a
relative parity among speakers.98
Stated more bluntly, "Blogging is writing. Period."9 9 Undoubtedly,
writing is speech. Even speech that seems trivial or irrelevant is protected
under the First Amendment. l° Moreover, it is irrelevant whether a blogger
is connected
to the established press. As the Court said in Branzburg v.
10
Hayes: '
[L]iberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer.., as
much as of the large metropolitan publisher . . . . [it] is a
"fundamental personal right" which "is not confined to newspapers
and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets ....
The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of
10 2
publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion."'
Thus, blogs have "con-verted 'the lonely pamphleteer' from a romantic
ideal to a powerful reality."10 3 Much like Revolutionary Era pamphlets,
blogs serve as "a vehicle of information and opinion."'" Consequently,
blogs are entitled to no less First Amendment protection than is accorded
to printed material.

97. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 882 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
98. Id. at 877.
99. Davidl L. Hudson, Jr., "Blogging," First Amendment Center, www.firstamendmentcenter.
org/Press/topic.aspx?topic=blogging (last visited Apr. 23, 2008).
100. See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion,DemocraticDeliberation,andHustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REv. 601,67273 (1990).
101. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
102. Id. at 704.
103. Anderson, supranote 61, at 434.
104. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 704.
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B. IntellectualPropertyConcerns
"As ajournalist,you 're inclined to wave the FirstAmendmentflag...
[however], [t]he media trends are at odds with the leagues' goal of
controllingdistributionand extracting a ransom. "105
"Intellectual property" is an umbrella phrase for various legal rights
associated with "commercially valuable products of the human
intellect."'" Copyrights and state tort laws are the two primary forms of
intellectual property protections applied to broadcast rights.' °7 This Part
analyzes the relevance of each in relation to blogs.
1. Copyrights
"Speakers... are invited to convey the ideas and facts containedwithin
the copyright holder's work... so long as they do so in words, graphics,
orother expressive components that arenot 'substantiallysimilar'to those
that comprise the copyright holder's work. "108
The Federal Copyright Act (Act)0 9 entitles broadcast rights holders to
a "limited monopoly" over their work. Congress's authority to do this
stems from the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, which states in part
that "Congress shall have Power... [tlo promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
' 0
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.""1
Pursuant to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause, the Act
establishes a "bundle ofrights"' for copyright owners including exclusive
105. Lapointe, supra note 1 (quoting Rich Gordon).
106. BLACK'S LAW DicTiONARY 359 (2d Pocket ed. 2001).
107. Thomas G. Field, Jr., What is Intellectual Property?,Jan. 2006, http://usinfo.state.gov/
products/pubs/intelprp/.
108. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54
STAN. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (2001).
109. See generally Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 90 Stat. 2541 (1976)
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)).
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
111. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 61 (1976) ("The five
fundamental rights that the bill gives to copyright owners-the exclusive rights of reproduction,
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rights to control how their works are performed, displayed, copied,
distributed, recorded, and adapted." 2 To enforce these rights, the Act
allows a copyright owner to sue any person or entity who infringes these
rights." 3 To prove infringement, the material must first be copyrightable
and second, the alleged copies must be "substantially similar" to the
original material.'14
a. The Underlying Game Is Not Copyrightable
There is a "general understanding that athletic events were, and are,
uncopyrightable.""' 5 In reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit in
National Basketball Association v. Motorola,"6 relied on one of the
fundamental principles of copyright law-that only original works of
authorship may be copyrighted." 7 As the Motorola court explained,
' 8
"[s]ports events are not 'authored' in any common sense of the word." "1
Since the landmark case of Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co., the Supreme Court has consistently held that originality is a
necessary element of a copyrightable work." 9
No one may claim originality as to facts. ... This is because facts

do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. The distinction is
one between creation and discovery: The first person to find and
report a particular fact has not created the fact; he or she has merely
discovered its existence .... [Thus,] [t]he same is true of all facts scientific, historical, biographical, and news of the day. "[T]hey
adaptation, publication, performance, and display-are stated generally in section 106. These
exclusive rights, which comprise the so-called 'bundle of rights' that is a copyright, are cumulative
and may overlap in some cases.").
112. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002).
113. See id. § 501.
114. To prevail in a copyright infringement action, the plaintiff must show that he has
ownership of the copyright, that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and that there
is a substantial similarity between the copyrighted work and the defendant's work. Litchfield v.
Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1984). However, since access is not disputed in Bennett's
case and it is not likely to be disputed in other blogging cases, it is assumed that the blogger has
access throughout this Article. Thus, the only elements analyzed here are whether the material is
copyrightable and whether a blog may be considered substantially similar to a television or radio
broadcast.
115. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1997).
116. Id.
117. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
118. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 846.
119. FeistPubl'ns,499 U.S. at 345. See also James E. Schatz et al., What's Mine Is Yours?
The Dilemma of a FactualCompilation, 17 U. DAYTON L. REv. 423, 427 (1991).
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may not be copyrighted and are part of the public domain available
to every person."' 2 °
Factual game information falls firmly within the Court's definition of
unoriginal, and thus uncopyrightable, fact.' 2 ' The Motorola decision
merely reinforces this long understood principle. In Motorola,the second
circuit was faced with whether a pager, which displayed statistical
information about professional basketball games, violated the NBA's
exclusive right to broadcast games.'2 2 The court held that since the pager
"reproduce[d] only factual information culled from the broadcasts and
[the pager] did not
none of the copyrightable expression of 2the
3 games,
infringe the copyright of the broadcasts."'
Prior to Motorola, only two decisions-one from the Supreme Court
case of Zacchini v. Scripps-HowardBroadcasting Co.'24 and the other
from the Seventh Circuit case of Baltimore Orioles,Inc., v. MajorLeague
Baseball Players Association -touched on the copyrightability of
underlying games. In Zacchini, Court dicta distinguished between a
"copyrighted dramatic work" and an uncopyrightable baseball game. 26 By
contrast, in a footnote from BaltimoreOrioles, the Seventh Circuit stated
"[p]layers' performances" contain the "modest creativity required for
copyright ability."' 127 However, the court added that "even if the [p]layers'
performances were not sufficiently creative, the [p]layers agree that the
cameramen and director contribute creative labor to the telecasts.' ' 28 As
the Motorola court said, "[t]his last sentence indicates that the court was
the copyright/ability [sic] of telecasts-not the underlying
considering
99129
games ...
120. Feist Publ'ns, 499 U.S. at 347-48 (citing 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 2.11 [A], 2.03[E] (1990)); accord Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) (holding that "no author may copyright his ideas or the
facts he narrates").
121. See generally Clifford N. MacDonald, Gamecasts and NBA v. Motorola: Do They Still
Love This Game?, 5 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 329 (2004); Note, Nothing But Internet, 110 HARV. L. REV.
1143, 1155 (1997) [hereinafter Harvard Law Review Note]; Thomas O'Connor, NBA Games Not
"OriginalWorks ofAuthorship "--NoProtectionUnderFederalCopyrightAct, 9 LOY.CONSUMER
L. REP. 225 (1997).
122. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 846.
123. Id.at 847.
124. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
125. 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986).
126. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575.
127. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 669 n.7.
128. Id.
129. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1997).
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More recently, a federal district court in C.B.C. Distribution &
Marketing, Inc., v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.,'3"
confronted the copyrightability of factual information from underlying
games.' 3 ' Specifically, the dispute in C.B.C. revolved around the use of
statistics in fantasy baseball-"a game whereby players manage imaginary
baseball teams based on the real-life performance of [Major League]
baseball players, and compete against one another using those player's
statistics to score points."'32 The C.B.C. court found that statistical
information is "'purely factual information which any patron of ...[a]
game could acquire from the arena."' 33 As such, it lacked the "sine qua
non of copyright--originality."' 34135Accordingly, the court held the
information was not copyrightable.
Thus, the weight of existing case law strongly suggests underlying
games and thus, the resulting facts, are not copyrightable. The lone indicia
that either may be-the Baltimore Orioles footnote indicating player
performances are sufficiently original to be copyrightable-was couched
in language that indicates the court was considering the copyrightability
of the telecasts rather than the underlying games.' 36 Moreover, Baltimore
Orioles has been heavily criticized for indicating that a baseball game
could be considered an original work of authorship. 37 As the Court has
consistently held, facts of any kind are part of the public domain and not
copyrightable.' 38 Thus, blogs should not be subject to copyright
infringement claims on the basis of reporting factual information from
underlying games.

130. 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
131. Id.at 1102-03.
132. See Wikipedia, Fantasy Baseball, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fantasybaseball
(describing history and game details) (as of Feb. 4, 2008, 14:00 EST).
133. C.B.C., 443 F. Supp. at 1102 (quoting Motorola, 105 F.3d at 847).
134. Id.at 1103.
135. Id.
136. See Motorola, 105 F.3d at 846.
137. See,e.g., Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 659 (5th Cir. 2000). See also DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMERON COPYRIGHT §§ 1.01 [B] [1] [C], 2.09 [F] (1999); Shelley Ross Saxer, Baltimore Orioles,
Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Association: The Right ofPublicity inGame Performances
and Federal Copyright Preemption, 36 UCLA L. REv. 861, 870 (1989); David E. Shipley, Three
Strikes and They're Out at the Old Ball Game: Preemption of Performers'Rights of Publicity
Under the Copyright Act of 1976,20 ARIz. ST. L.J. 369, 384-88 (1988).
138. See,e.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991).
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b. Game Broadcasts and the "Substantially Similar" Requirement
Whether a claim for copyright infringement could stand for the
broadcast of the game as opposed to the underlying game itself is a
separate question. The broadcast of a game is copyrightable as a work
consisting of sounds, images, or both, that is being transmitted, and is
"fixed" or recorded simultaneously with its transmission. 139 The Act
expressly protects sports broadcasts: "The bill seeks to resolve ....

the

status of live broadcasts [of] sports, news coverage, live performances of
music, etc.-that are reaching the public in unfixed form but that are
simultaneously being recorded."' 4 ° Thus, "[i]f the program content is
transmitted live to the public while being recorded at the same time" it is
copyrightable.' 4 ' Sports broadcasts, therefore, are copyrightable.
To infringe upon a copyrighted broadcast, however, would require the
copyright holder to prove that the allegedly infringing work was
"substantially similar" to the copyrighted work. 42 Courts apply several
tests to determine substantial similarity however, most tests use some
version of the "ordinary observer" test. 14 3 This test asks whether an
ordinary observer would detect a substantial similarity between the two
works.'"
For example, in Arnstein v. Porter, a famous case involving popular
music, the Second Circuit, using the ordinary observer test, held there was
a substantial similarity where "defendant took from plaintiffs work so
much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the
audience for whom such popular music is composed, that defendant

139. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2003).
140. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 52 (1976).

141.' Id.
142. See Eric C. Osterberg, The MeaningandSignificanceofSubstantialSimilarity,Practicing
Law Institute, Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series PLI
Order No. 8951, (May 2006). See, e.g., Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir.
1966).
143. See, e.g., Country Kids 'N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1288 (10th Cir.
1996); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442-43 (9th Cir. 1994); Warner
Bros. v. Am. Broad. Co., 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983); Concord Fabrics, Inc. v. Marcus Bros.
Textile Corp., 409 F.2d 1315 (2d Cir. 1969); Ideal Toy Corp, 360 F.2d at 1021; Peter Pan Fabrics,
Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487,489 (2d Cir. 1960); Chase-Riboud v. Dreamworks, Inc.,
987 F. Supp. 1222 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
144. Judge Learned Hand explained the ordinary observer test by saying that a substantial
similarity exists where "the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be
disposed to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same." PeterPan Fabrics,274
F.2d at 489.
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wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to plaintiff."' 45
Similarly, if a blog took the words of the television broadcasters and
posted them verbatim that would likely be considered a substantially
similar work, assuming the other elements were met, copyright
infringement.'46 However, the only thing a blog takes is uncopyrightable
facts.' 47 Thus, there is no substantial similarity between a blog and a
television or radio broadcast.
2. The State Law Tort of Commercial Misappropriation
"[T]he misappropriationdoctrine, which often covered sportingevents,
developed in state law as a means to protect labor and money expended
in collecting information used for business purposes. Generally the
information was used in works which were not copyrightable. ...

"148

a. Misappropriation and "Hot News"
Since underlying games are not copyrightable and copyrighted
broadcasts are only infringed by substantially similar works-which blogs
are not-any effort by broadcast rights holders to claim exclusive
intellectual property rights in real-time data from .its games could only be
based on a state law tort founded on a proprietary right in that data. 149 This
kind of claim is generically referred to as the tort of "commercial
misappropriation."' 5 ° Black's Law Dictionarydefines misappropriation as

145. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946).
146. See Osterberg, supra note 142.
147. An event blog, such as Bennett's, merely posts uncopyrightable facts.
148. Katherine F. Horvath, NBA v. Motorola: A Case for Federal Preemption of
Misappropriation?,73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 461, 461 (1998).
149. See Andrea Freeman, Morris Communications v. PGA Tour: Battle Over the Rights to
Real-Time Sports Scores, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 3 (2005); Gary R. Roberts, The Scope of the
Exclusive Right to ControlDisseminationof Real-Time Sports Event Information, 15 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 167, 169 (2004); Marc S. Williams, CopyrightPreemption:Real-Time Dissemination
of Sports Scores and Information, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 445, 447 (1998).
150. "Misappropriation," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 106, at 449; see also U.S.
GolfAss'n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d 1028, 1034-35 (3d Cir. 1984).
The doctrine of "misappropriation," which is a distinct branch of unfair
competition,... has been applied to a variety of situations in which the courts
have sensed that one party was dealing "unfairly" with another, but which were
not covered by the three established statutory systems protecting intellectual
property: copyright, patent, and trademark/deception as to origin.
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"[tihe common-law tort of using the noncopyrightable information or ideas
that an organization collects and disseminates for a profit to compete
unfairly against that organization .... "'i"
The Supreme Court established the misappropriation doctrine in the
1918 case of International News Service v. Associated Press.5 2 In
InternationalNew Service, International News Service (INS) copied news
stories from early editions of Associated Press (AP) east coast newspapers
and sold the stories to west coast markets."5 3 The Supreme Court held that
INS's use of AP's information was an unlawful "misappropriation" under
federal common law. 5 4 As the Court explained:
[INS], by its very act, admits that it is taking material that has been
acquired by [AP] as the result of organization and the expenditure
of labor, skill, and money, and which is salable by complainant for
money, and that defendant in appropriating it and selling it as its
own is endeavoring to reap where it has not sown, and by disposing
of it to newspapers that are competitors of complainant's members
is appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have sown.
Stripped of all disguises, the process amounts to an unauthorized
interference with the normal operation of complainant's legitimate
business precisely at the point where the profit is to be reaped, in
order to divert a material portion of the profit from those who have
earned it to those who have not; with special advantage to
defendant in the competition because of the fact that it is not
burdened with any part of the expense of gathering the news.'
Labor courts relied on International News Service to limit the
dissemination real-time information from sporting events. For instance, a
federal district court in the 1938 case of PittsburghAthletic Co. v. KQV
BroadcastingCo.,' 56 enjoined a radio station from broadcasting Pittsburgh
Pirates home games from a vantage point across the street from the
stadium.' The Pirates ownership had already granted exclusive broadcast
rights to another company and according to the PittsburghAthletic court,

Id.
151.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th

ed. 2004).

152. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
153. Id.
at231.
154. Id.
155. Id.at 239-40.
156. 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938).
157. PittsburghAthletic Co., 24 F. Supp. at 492.
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KQV's competing broadcast interfered with these exclusive rights.' 58
Following the rationale from InternationalNews Service, the Pittsburgh
Athletic court reasoned, "[t]he Athletic Company has at great expense,
acquired and maintains a baseball park, pays the players who participate
a legitimate right to capitalize on the news value
in the game, and have ...
59
of their games."'
The International News Service case and its progeny became
synonymous with the "hot news" exception-a narrow exception to the
general rule that facts cannot be owned. 160 The phrase "hot news" is used
to describe time-sensitive information. 161Under the exception, "hot news,"
like other facts, is still not copyrightable; however, it may be protected
under state tort law so long as certain elements are met.' 62 The necessary
elements of a "hot news" misappropriation claim are:
generates or collects information at some cost or
1. "The plaintiff
163
expense.'

2. "The value of the information is highly time-sensitive.""
free-riding on the
3. "The defendant's use of the information constitutes
165
it.'
collect
or
generate
to
effort
plaintiffs costly
4. "The defendant's use of the information is in166direct competition with
a product or service offered by the plaintiff.'
5. "The ability of other parties to free-ride on the efforts of the plaintiff
that its
would so reduce the incentive to produce the product or service
' 67
existence or quality would be substantially threatened.'
b. The Retrenchment of the Misappropriation Doctrine
Even assuming the above elements are met, subsequent developments
in the law have sharply limited the misappropriation doctrine as a viable
cause of action. First, the legal foundation for the INS decision-federal
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See Alan D. Lieb, NBA v. Motorola and Stats, Inc.: The Second CircuitProperlyLimits
the "Hot News Doctrine," 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 197, 202 (1997) ("The hot
news doctrine has its roots in the seminal case of InternationalNews Service v. Associated
").
Press....
161. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1997).
162. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 242 (1918).
163. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 852.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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general common law- was eliminated by the Supreme Court in Erie
Railroadv. Tompkins.168 Thus, federal misappropriation claims are now
obsolete. Moreover, few states have recognized the tort of
misappropriation in any context relevant to this Article and some states
reject it outright. 169 As the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
explained:
The facts of the INS decision are unusual and may serve, in part, to
limit its rationale.... The limited extent to which the INS rationale
has been incorporated into the common law of the states indicate
that the decision is properly viewed as a response to unusual
a statement of generally applicable
circumstances rather than as
170
principles of common law.
Furthermore, the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976 effectively
preempted most state law misappropriation claims. 171 Under section 301
of the Act, a state law claim is preempted when: (1) the state law claim
seeks to vindicate "legal or equitable rights that are equivalent" to any of
the exclusive rights already protected by copyright law under 17 U.S.C. §

168. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("There is no federal general common law.").
169. Roberts, supra note 149, at 171.
In the years following INS, courts in fourteen states recognized the general tort of
misappropriation as a matter of their state law, although in two of those states
(Alaska and Delaware), the only courts to recognize the tort under the state's law
were local federal courts. Thus, there are thirty-six states that have not recognized
it in any context remotely relevant to the subject of this article, and a couple
(Massachusetts and Hawaii) in which the courts have appeared to reject it outright.
Id.
170. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 cmt. c (1995).

171. See Paul M. Enright, "SportsTrax: They Love This Game!" A Comment on the NBA v.
Motorola, 7 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 449, 465-66 (1997) ("Congress amended the Copyright Act
in 1976. In doing so, it provided, inter alia, for the preemption of state law claims that are
interrelated with copyright claims in certain ways."); Louis Klein, National Basketball Association
v. Motorola, Inc.: FutureProspectsforProtectingReal-Time Information,64 BROOK. L. REv. 585,
593-94 (1998) ("The enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976 effectively abolished the dual system
of copyright protection that had existed under the 1909 Copyright Act. By including section 301,
Congress specifically intended to do away with this dual system and instead adopt a single federal
system of statutoryprotection."); Roberts, supranote 149, at 172 ("[T]he Copyright Act was passed
in 1976 and includes a broad preemption of state laws .. "); Jean Tibbetts, National Basketball
Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc.: Second Circuit Clarifies Copyright Preemptionfor New Technology, 3
B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 16, 12-13 (1997) (explaining that only a limited "hot news" exception
survives preemption).
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106-the "general scope requirement";.. and (2) the particular work to
which the state law claim is being applied falls within the type of works
protected by the Copyright Act under Sections 102 and 103-the "subject
matter requirement."' 7 3 It is beyond the scope of this Article to fully
explore the preemptive effect of the Act; however, most commentators
agree that only a narrow "hot news" exception survives preemption.174
c. "Hot News" and Blogs
Even if the "hot news" claim survived preemption, at least two
elements of a "hot news" claim are not present with blogs: (1) free-riding
and (2) direct competition.175 In a closely analogous case, the Motorola
court explained the lack of free-riding in the context of a cellular pager:
An indispensable element of an INS "hot-news" claim is free riding
by a defendant on a plaintiff's product, enabling the defendant to
produce a directly competitive product for less money because it
has lower costs. SportsTrax is not such a product. The use of pagers
to transmit real-time information about NBA games requires: (i) the
collecting of facts about the games; (ii) the transmission of these
facts on a network; (iii) the assembling of them by the particular
service; and (iv) the transmission of them to pagers or an on-line
computer site. Appellants are in no way free-riding on Gamestats.
Motorola and STATS expend their own resources to collect purely
factual information generated in NBA games to transmit to

172. See Copyright Act of 1976 § 301(a)-(b), 17 U.S.C. § 301(a)-(b) (2000).
[A]II legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of
authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the
subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103 ... are governed
exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or
equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.
Id.
173. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2000).
174. See, e.g., Roberts supra note 149; Claudia Werner, NBA v. Motorola & Stats, Inc.: RealTime Basketball Scores-News orProperty?, 7 DEPAuL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 288, 289 (1997);
Williams, supra note 149, at 450.
175. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1997) (describing the
fourth element of a "hot news" claim as direct competition with a product or service offered by the
plaintiff).
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SportsTrax pagers. They have
their own network and assemble and
76
transmit data themselves.1

Similarly, blogs "expend their own resources to collect purely factual
information" about sporting and other events.1 7 Like the Motorolapagers,
blogs use their own network to "assemble and transmit data
themselves.', 178 Thus, blogs do not free-ride off of the rights holder's
investment in covering a game or event.
Additionally, the direct competition element of a "hot news" claim is
missing since there is no direct competition between a blog and a
television or radio broadcast in either's primary market. 179 Direct
competition in the primary market is necessary to satisfy the direct
competition element of a "hot news" claim; whereas, competition in the
secondary market is irrelevant. 8 ' The secondary market is defined as
"collateral services generated by the success of one's business venture."''
In Motorola, the court rejected the NBA's argument that the Motorola
pagers directly competed with broadcasts of NBA games." 2 As the court
explained:
In our view, the NBA has failed to show any competitive effect
whatsoever from [Motorola].... With regard to the NBA's primary

products-producing basketball games with live attendance and
licensing copyrighted broadcasts of those games-there is no
evidence that anyone regards [the Motorola pagers] as a substitute
for attending NBA games or watching them on television. In fact,
Motorola markets [their pagers] as being designed "for those times

176. Id. at 854.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.at 853.
180. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 853.
181. Id.at 853 n.8. (citing Nat'l Football League v. Governor of State of Delaware, 435 F.
Supp. 1372 (D. Del. 1977)).
182. Id.at 854; see also Harvard Law Review Note, supra note 121, at 1155.
The NBA and Motorola participate in different and wholly distinct industries-the
creation and marketing of professional basketball games, on the one hand, and the
development of pager and wireless technology, on the other. They are not
competitors, and therefore, according to the legislative record, New York's
common law of misappropriation should have been preempted-never applied.

KENTUCKY FRIED BLOG

when you cannot be at the arena, watch the game on TV, or listen
to the radio .... ,,183
Similarly, blogs do not directly compete with television or radio
broadcasts. Much like the Motorola pagers, blogs were designed for
people who "cannot be at the arena, watch the game on TV, or listen to the
radio."' 4 Also, there is no evidence blogs are used as a substitute for inperson or television viewing. Comments sent to the Courier-Journalfrom
blog readers indicated most, if not all, read the blog because they were
unable to view the game on television or listen on the radio.185 Thus, like
the Motorola pagers, blogs are not in direct competition with television or
radio broadcasts. Accordingly, a "hot news" misappropriation claim would
be unlikely to prevail against a blog.
3. Other Intellectual Property Protections
"[T]his case is not about copyright law, the Constitution, the First
Amendment, orfreedom of the press in news reporting. This case is a
straight-forwardantitrustcase ....
86
Although most claims in broadcast rights cases arise under copyright
or state tort law, a recent federal district court case based on antitrust
claims highlights the potential for other types of claims to restrict the
dissemination of time-sensitive information from sporting events. 8 7 In
Morris Communications v. PGA Tour, Inc.,"88 a federal district court held
that under antitrust law, the PGA had a property right in golf tournament
scores compiled by the use of a special relay scoring system it
developed.'8 9 Using this relay system,' 9 scores from around the
183. Id. at 853-54.
184. Id.
185. Telephone Interview with Brian Bennett, Columnist, Louisville Courier-Journal, in
Louisville, KY (June 18, 2007).
186. Morris Commc'ns Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288, 1292-93 (1 1th Cir. 2004),
affg 235 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (M.D. Fla. 2002).
187. Morris, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 1269.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1281 ("[T]he Court finds that the PGA Tour does have a property right in the scores
compiled by the use of [its scoring system].").
190. Id. at 1272-74.
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tournament were transmitted to a PGA media center, compiled, and then
made available to the public through the PGA web site.19' Morris wanted
access to the media center, so it could post the scores on its web site
without having to wait for the scores to first be posted on the PGA's web
site.' 92 The Morris court held that so long as the information was
unavailable in the public domain, the PGA had a property right in the
information and could restrict Morris's access on that basis. 93 However,
the Morris court added that the PGA's "property right vanishes [once] the
scores are in the public domain."' 94
Although Morris is distinguishable from Motorola in many ways, 95
Due to the nature and size of golf courses, which may span as much as 150 acres,
comprehensive real-time scores-that is, up-to-the-minute scores of every
competitor-can only be compiled using a relay system such as [the one the PGA
developed]. During a golf tournament, different groups of players compete
contemporaneously at different holes such that any one spectator can only view
a limited number of players at any one of the eighteen holes. Thus, in order to
generate real-time scores, it is necessary to have individuals stationed at each hole
as the tournament progresses so that the entire golf course can be monitored
simultaneously. Acknowledging that some kind of relay system is needed to
generate the type of real-time scoring information it wishes to syndicate, Morris
submits that it is unable to implement such a system itself due to the PGA Tour
rules prohibiting unauthorized use of wireless communication devices on the golf
course at its tournaments.
Id.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.at 1274.
Id.
See Morris, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 1279.
Id.at 1281.
Id.at 1279-80.
Three distinctions between Motorola and the instant case make Morris's claim
untenable. First, the Motorola court used a very high standard for freeriding that
is applicable only in cases with the hot news exception, which will be discussed
in greater detail below. More importantly, the information that Motorola used to
create its product was in the public domain, having been broadcast on television
or radio. Specifically, Motorola-paid reporters, who had heard the radio or
television broadcast scores, reported the information to a central location and
merely relayed what had been known to the world. Golf, unlike basketball,
precludes a single person gathering all the information occurring on all 18 holes.
So when television and radio cover a basketball game, the score is presented to the
public through those media outlets, allowing Motorola to obtain the information
and republish it. If Morris were able to gather scores from all 18 holes through a
television or radio broadcast, Morris could then republish that information, absent
a hot-news exception. However, golf's atypical format prevents any single
television or radio broadcast from providing results from all 18 holes live. The
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one ofthe fundamental lessons from both cases is that whether information
may be restricted depends on whether the information is available in the
public domain. Until it is, courts will likely find broadcast rights holders
enjoy some kind of property right in the information. However, once the
information is available in the public domain, remedies available to
broadcast rights holders are sharply limited or gone.
C. The PublicInterest
The First Amendment and the Copyright Clause of the U.S.
Constitution are based partly on a strong public interest in the availability
of information. As the Supreme Court said in Turner Broadcasting,Inc.
v. FederalCommunication Commission,196 a fundamental purpose of the
First Amendment is to protect the public's access to a broad range of
information sources so that each person can "decide for him or herself the
ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and
adherence."' 97 In much the same way, copyrights are intended to foster the
development of new sources of information by providing a financial
incentive to create and disseminate original expression to the public.
Because blogs are a source of information and original expression, there
is a strong public policy argument in favor of encouraging their growth.
Rather than be feared, blogs should be seen as valuable tools to spark
interest in sporting and other events. As journalist, Gabe DeArmond said,
"Ultimately ... it's just another way to spread the word about their events.
...
I would think they'd want to get the word out to as many people as

PGA Tour does publish the scores in the media center, but the media cannot
disseminate that information except as the PGA Tour's press credentials allow
them to do. As a result, the scores, which are not protected by copyright, remain
outside the public domain and within the PGA Tour's control, because the PGA
Tour provides access with certain restrictions. Finally, Motorola benefited from
the NBA's costs in producing and marketing the games and from the radio and
television stations who paid for broadcast rights: that is Motorola capitalized on
the NBA's positive externalities. However, the NBA and the broadcast stations
had already reaped the profits of their investment, and the information was in the
public domain at the moment of broadcasting. Additionally, once in the public
domain, Motorola "expend[ed] their own resources to collect purely factual
information generated in NBA games." While here, Morris does not expend its
own resources in gathering information, which is not in the public domain, but
instead free-rides on the PGA Tour's compilation of scores.
Id.
196. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
197. Id. at 641.
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they possibly can." '98 This is particularly true in sports like college
baseball where interest is growing, but coverage in many places is scant.
Essentially, blogs are free press for the events they cover. As such,
sporting and other event organizers should welcome their presence. Where
blogs are already present, the law should protect them.
Legal arguments aside, it seems impossible to prevent blogging
anyway. If blogger's are forced from the press box, there is not much the
NCAA or others could do to prevent them from blogging from the stands
or across the street in a sports bar. However, this would be an unfortunate
result for all, since media credentials provide access to information and
sources that can enrich reporting in blogs. The greater depth of reporting
made possible by media credentials serves to further enhance interest in
the sport and the blog. Thus, the public interest is better served by
cooperation, rather than conflict, between event organizers and bloggers.
IV. CONCLUSION

The intersection of the First Amendment and intellectual property is
nothing new. What is new is how the Internet is changing the interaction
between the two. To ensure blogs and other new technologies are allowed
to fulfill their potential to enhance communication and foster expression,
a fresh approach is needed.
To determine the appropriate level of First Amendment protection for
new technologies, the medium-specific approach must be abandoned in
favor of analogical reasoning. Because the Internet blurs the distinctions
between different mediums of communication, the medium-specific
approach is no longer useful. Analogical reasoning is superior because of
its adaptability. Regardless of the particular technology, a fitting analogy
always will be useful in determining its relation to the First Amendment.
A greater recognition of what copyright protects also will be helpful in
fostering the growth of new technologies. An "engine of free expression,"
copyright law should encourage new forms of communication rather than
inhibit them. However, as Bennett illustrates that is not always the case.
As decisions are made about how best to adjust to the shifting
relationship between the First Amendment and intellectual property
protections caused by new technologies, public policy also must be
considered. Public policy favors promoting speech and the availability of

198. Joe Walljasper, NCAA Rule on Blogs Does Not Compute, COLUMBIATRm., June 14,2007
(quoting Gene DeArmond), available at http://www.columbiatribune.com/2007/Jun/
20070614Spor005.asp.
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information through blogs. Blogs are inexpensive, efficient, and easily
accessible forms of communication. Rather than compete with existing
coverage of events, blogs augment it. A fresh approach that takes into
account these considerations is necessary going forward.
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